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We show how complex privacy requirements can be 
represented and processed by an extended model of Attribute 
Based Access Control (ABAC), working with a simple database 
applications pattern. During application model development, most 
likely based on UML (e.g. Use Case, Class Diagrams), the analyst 
and possibly the end user specifies ABAC permissions, and then 
verifies their effect by running queries on the target data. The 
ABAC model supports positive and negative permissions, “break 
glass” overrides of negative permissions, and message/alert 
generation. The permissions combining algorithms are based on 
relational database optimisation, and permissions processing is 
implemented by query modification, producing structurally-
optimised queries in an SQL-like language; the queries can then 
be processed by many database and big data systems. The method 
and models have been implemented in a prototype Privacy 
Preferences Tool in collaboration with a large medical records 
development, and we discuss experiences with focus group 
evaluations of this tool. (Abstract) 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the development of web – database applications, the 
design and implementation of authorisation policies (the 
granting of access to permitted resources) has often been left 
to the later stages, sometimes being implemented by 
procedural coding. To-date, the most widely-used model of 
authorization has been Role Based Access Control, or RBAC 
[1], which is used in operating systems, databases, access 
control systems for specialized applications, and development 
environments. Attribute Based Access Control, or ABAC, is 
generally seen as the way forward for authorization model 
research, see e.g. [2]. ABAC has been considerably developed 
over recent years, with several NIST publications, e.g. [3], 
XACML standard [4], and product offerings, e.g. Axiomatics 
[5]. Recent research work includes identifying  attributes from 
applications [6], and implementation schemes [7]. The central 
idea of ABAC is that access can be determined based on 
various attribute values presented by a subject. In this paper 
we describe our extended ABAC model which we call the 
Tees Confidentiality Model, version 2, or TCM2 [8, 9], and its 
application to healthcare and social services scenarios. 
Health and Social Care information systems are 
undergoing substantial development at the present time, and 
bring very demanding challenges for authorisation. Five large 
health record exemplar projects are being part-funded by the 
UK government [10], with other projects proceeding with 
separate funding arrangements.  These projects variously 
provide access for Health Care Professionals (HCPs) and 
Social Workers to records held in GP and social care systems. 
A further aim is to support medical research by granting 
established researchers access to Trusted Research 
Environments, containing data uploaded from operational 
systems. The issue of governance has received huge attention 
with the arrival of GDPR [11], the new Data Protection Act 
[12], and NHS and GMC systems and Guidelines [13]. There 
is a move towards recognising that data should be owned by 
the patient/citizen, who should be able to control who has 
access to it [14]. 
The GMC guidelines suggest a warning to providing full 
patient control over sharing their data for direct care. 
Paragraph 31 of [13] deals with a worst-case scenario where a 
patient totally objects to the sharing of information deemed 
necessary for their safe care – the advice given to the HCP Is 
to refuse to extend their treatment or refer them, unless their 
data can be shared. The GMC advises that through argument 
and explanation both parties should attempt to arrive at a 
compromise to allow sharing. We suggest in this paper an 
approach to support arriving at compromise, through 
facilitating alerts and overrides for key HCPs. 
We begin by commenting on authorisation models, their 
presentation to end users, and implementation. We then 
describe motivating scenarios and situations. Following this 
we describe a simple database pattern which can be part of the 
implementation of complex health and social care 
authorisation scenarios. We then introduce our TCM2 ABAC 
model by presenting a permissions representation for two 
complex healthcare scenarios, before summarising how they 
can be implemented using database and other technologies. 
Finally we give an overview of our TCM2 implementation 
which supports the capture and user-verification of the ABAC 
permissions, and its focus group evaluation. 
II. METHODS, MODELS AND REQUIREMENTS ELICITATION 
UML (including Use Case, Class Diagrams) is a widely-
used notation for systems development. There are several 
widely-used methods which can take advantage of UML, 
including agile (e.g. Scrum, XP) + others [15]. Elements of 
UML, particularly Use Case, Classes are very suitable for 
presentation to analysts and end users during the construction 
of ABAC models. They can be presented with user-friendly 
descriptions appropriate to end users. User stories and Use 
Case models indicate typical users and functionality. Class 
Diagrams or Entity Relationship Diagrams indicate ABAC 
Protected Objects. 
The TCM2 model presented in this paper was originally 
developed from the RBAC standard, and we refer to 
permissions rather than rules. However our terminology 
corresponds to the XACML standard. A feature of our ABAC 
model, which does not appear in the academic literature as far 
as we know, is the support and processing of “break glass” 
overrides. The HCP or analyst can optionally define 
progressively stricter levels of access to sensitive data, with 
selectively defined overrides for restricted or emergency 
access. 
For implementation, one approach is to modify user 
transactions with restrictions generated from the ABAC 
model. Queries are most suitably expressed in a high-level, 
usually SQL-like language supported by the underlying 
storage systems, which might be relational database, NoSQL, 
Hadoop or other big data systems. Many database and big data 
systems (e.g. NoSQL and Hadoop-based systems) support a 
variant of SQL; we use SQL to present the approach to 
implementation described in this paper.  
III. SCENARIO 1 
A. Summary 
This scenario was suggested by a Consultant Transplant 
Surgeon during the design and development of an Electronic 
Health Records (EHR) system. 
The scenario concerns a fictitious patient, Alice, and her GP, 
Fred. Alice is 50; the major events in Alice’s medical history 
are: 
 
1. She had a pregnancy termination when she was 16 
2. Was diagnosed diabetic at 25 
3. End Stage renal failure when she was 45 
4. Renal transplant at 48 
5. Acutely psychotic at 49 
6. Crush fracture of T12 aged 50 
 
Let us now suppose, not unreasonably, that Alice expresses 
the desire to place the following privacy directives on the 
availability of her EHR data about two of these conditions: 
 
a) My GP (Fred) can see all my data 
b) Nobody must know about my termination except my 
GP, any Gynaecological Consultant, and the 
Consultant Renal Transplant Surgeon (Bill) who 
operated on me. 
c) My GP, Consultant Renal Transplant Surgeon (Bill) 
and Consultant Orthopaedic Surgeon (Bob) can see 
my psychosis data, but no-one else. 
 
To show the power of our TCM2 model, consider the 
following contrived requirement (but still one which an EHR 
authorization system should be capable of handling): 
 
d) I do not wish the members of the hospital team who 
carried out my termination operation to be ever able 
to see my psychosis data, except if they are viewing 
in a psychiatric role. (This directive to be in force 
throughout the careers of those professionals 
concerned). 
 
We must add to these directives that they must be capable of 
being overridden in carefully controlled and audited ways. 
An example of overriding follows. 
 
B. Transaction 
Consider the following transaction which requires access 
to restricted data, and illustrates the need for an override 
capability. The clinician user is a transplant surgeon, querying 
Alice’s medical data. The termination data is unavailable to 
the surgeon and all users for a normal query except those listed 
in directives (a) and (b) above. 
Alice has been scheduled for a transplant (event 4). She 
has previously been persuaded by her GP to make her 
termination data available to a limited number of medical 
specialist roles, Transplant Surgeon being one of these. Tests 
lead the surgeon to suspect a previous pregnancy (if the tissue 
type of the father is similar to the graft a very serious rejection 
may ensue). Alice refuses to confirm a pervious pregnancy to 
the surgeon. A message is displayed, for any user in the 
Transplant Surgeon role, saying that he can and should use the 
override facility. The surgeon elects to override, and this 
displays the data that he needs. This allows for a specific form 
of treatment to be planned. 
Note that this data will not be displayed upon override to 
roles not included with the original agreement with Alice. The 
permissions which implement these restrictions are described 
in section VI.A. 
IV. SCENARIO 2 
In a Network of Things or Internet of Thngs system, 
inferences may be drawn from data generated by devices 
which suggest the existence of otherwise protected 
information. Consider a technician with authorization to 
inspect location tracking data for patients and equipment in a 
hospital. Coincidences in location indicate that a patient 
might be suffering from the condition that the equipment is 
used to monitor/treat. Access to this medical information 
would normally be denied to the technician’s role; if the data 
is especially sensitive, it may have had additional restrictions 
placed on its medical records availability. 
 
To prevent such inferences being drawn, the conceptual 
model of the application and the NoT are analyzed to identify 
attributes common to scenario and NoT objects. The security 
architect can then decide that for basic authorizations (e.g. to 
a technician role) that either no data or default data (e.g. 
normal patient bed location, equipment storage location) is to 
be presented. The location data now does not coincide. TCM2 
permissions which effect this disguising of data are illustrated 
below in section VII.B. 
 
V. HEALTHCARE AUTHORISATION PATTERN 
We now describe part of a conceptual model covering health 
and social care data, and perhaps other data. Tables of this 
data model, and their contents, are the Protected Objects 
(POs) which are part of our TCM2 model. The data model 
tables correspond to the Healthgateway MIG Detailed Care 
Record [16], which is used in several major projects in 
England. Our model has other tables containing data about 
patients, demographics, HCPs, which are peripheral to our 
current theme, and not described here. In a full-scale system, 
the actual data might be stored in several systems, with their 
data models mapped onto our conceptual model. Note that the 
tables in our model could be used for deriving other 
representations, such as NoSQL Document databases. JSON 
representations, and others.  
 
The master-detail pattern which we are primarily concerned 
with is shown in the following diagram: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Specialisations of EVENT_M (not shown in the diagram) are 
PROBLEM, DIAGNOSIS, MEDICATION, 
INVESIGATION, RISKS_WARNINGS, PROCEDURES, 
BLOOD_PRESSURE_MEASUREMENTS. 
 
EVENT_D contains records of every encounter involving a 
patient and an HCP, whether it be notes from a telephone 
conversation, an admission, a referral, etc. EVENT_M and its 
specializations serve two purposes. Firstly to contain data, 
e.g. a PROBLEM record might be for Diabetes, and have 
attributes such as Date_of_Diagnosis, Clinician_of_Care, 
etc; this can be associated with all EVENT_D instances 
which would contain data about e.g. individual appointments, 
etc, for Diabetes. An EVENT_D instance can be associated 
with more than one EVENT_M instance. For example, an 
EVENT_D record of the issuing of a prescription for 
Diabetes would be associated with both MEDICATION and 
PROBLEM instances.  
 
The full set of attributes of these tables are based on 
documents designed by the Professional Records Standards 
Body [17]. 
VI. SCENARIO PERMISSIONS REPRESENTATION 
A. Permissions for Scenario 1 (Health and Social Care) 
As an introduction to our TCM2 model we now give 
examples of permissions. Abbreviations are used to facilitate 
concise presentation, however they correspond to the data 
structures and values used for implementation. We call our 
permissions T Permissions, or TPs, to distinguish them from 
RBAC permissions, and other ABAC rule formulations. TPs 
consist of sets of classifier values; an example of a classifier 
value is <UserRole, ‘Psychiatrist’>. Classifier values can 
represent information other than attribute values, as is 
explained in section VII.A below. They are structured into 
hierarchies, which enable further TPs to be derived with more 
specialized classifier values, e.g. a TP with <UserRole, 
‘Psychiatrist’> could produce a derived TP with <UserRole, 
‘SeniorPsychiatrist’>. 
 
Firstly, the EHR data for any patient is normally made 
available to 
 
a) Healthcare professionals (HCPs) such as clinicians, 
doctors, and administrators who have a Legitimate 
Relationship (LR) with the patient. This means that the 
patient is registered with or has been referred to them. 
b) Additionally, all HCPs can exercise a Level 1 TP 
Override facility (see section VII.C), to exceptionally 
access restricted data, when they have reason to do so. 
Naturally, all access and overrides will be logged, and 
subject to audit. 
 
The following permissions authorize this access.  
 
 
TP1  Permit_TP (N):   
{<Database, ‘EHR’>, 
<UserRole, ‘HCP’>, 
  <LR, ‘yes’>,  
  <Op_id, ‘R_A’>} 
TP2  Permit_TP(L1_Ovr):   
{<Database, ‘EHR’>, 
<UserRole, ‘HCP’>, 
  <LR, ‘yes’>,  
  <Op_id, ‘R_A’>} 
 
 
TP1 represents the granting of read and append access to 
EHR database data for a clinician-user in the role of 
Healthcare Professional (HCP), under normal (N) processing 
where no override has been used. A Legitimate Relationship 
(LR) must exist. TP2 permits access for any HCP to any EHR 
data if the user has exercised a Level 1 Override. 
The TPs which implement the privacy directives given in 
section III.A, in the order in which they are expressed, are 
 
TP3  Deny_TP(L1):  
{<Database, ‘EHR’>, 
  <UserRole, ‘HCP’>,   
  <PO_Subj_id,  ‘Alice’ >, 
   <PO_Problem, 
‘Termination’>} 
TP4  Permit_TP (N):  
{<Database, ‘EHR’>, 
  <User_id, ‘Fred’>,  
  <UserRole, ‘GP’>, 
  <Op_id, ‘R_A’>, 
  <PO_Subj_id,  ‘Alice’ >, 
  <PO_Problem, 
‘Termination’>} 
TP5  Permit_TP (N):  
{<Database, ‘EHR’>, 
  <UserRole, ‘GC’>, 
  <Op_id, ‘R_A’>, 
  <PO_Subj_id,  ‘Alice’ >, 
  <PO_Problem, 
‘Termination’>} 
 
TP6  Permit_TP (N): 
{<Database, ‘EHR’>, 
   <User_id, <’Bill’ >, 
   <Op_id, ‘R_A’>, 
  <PO_Subj_id,  ‘Alice’ >, 
  <PO_Problem, 
‘Termination’>}  
 
TP7  Deny_TP(L1):  
{<Database, ‘EHR’>, 
  <UserRole, ‘HCP’>,   
  <PO_Subj_id,  ‘Alice’ >, 
  <PO_Problem, 
‘Psychosis’>} 
 
TP8  Permit_TP (N):  
{<Database, ‘EHR’>, 
  <User_id, ‘Fred’>,  
  <UserRole, ‘GP’>, 
  <Op_id, ‘R_A’>, 
   <PO_Subj_id,  ‘Alice’ >, 
   <PO_Problem, 
‘Psychosis’>} 
 
TP9  Permit_TP (N): 
 {<Database, ‘EHR’>, 
 <User_id, < ‘Bill’, ‘Bob’> 
  <Op_id, ‘R_A’>, 
  <PO_Subj_id,  ‘Alice’ >, 
  <PO_Problem, 
‘Psychosis’>} 
 
TP10  Permit_TP(N):   
{<Database, ‘EHR’>, 
  <User_Coll_id, 
‘TermTeam’>, 
  <UserRole, 
‘Psychiatrist’>, 
  <Op_id, ‘R_A’>, 
  <PO_Subj_id,  ‘Alice’ >, 
  <PO_Problem, 
‘Termination’> 
 
 
Deny TPs are negative permissions which prevent access. 
These can be very detailed, for specific users and data, TP3 
denies (at Level 1) any kind of access to Alice’s termination 
data to HCPs. However if authorized by another TP, e.g. 
TP12 below, a transplant surgeon could use TP Override at 
Level 1 to cancel the effect of the deny permission TP3. 
EVENT_D EVENT_M 
0..* 0..* 
The permissions which generate the message advising 
override to the transplant surgeon, and which provide the L1 
Override for the transaction scenario in section III.B, are 
 
TP11  Deny_TP (L1):  
{<Database, ‘EHR’>, 
  <UserRole, 
‘TransplantSurgeon’>, 
  <LR, ‘yes’>,  
  <PO_Subj_id,  ‘Alice’ >, 
  <PO_Problem, 
‘Termination’>} 
 
TP12  
Permit_TP(L1_Ovr): 
{<Database, ‘EHR’>, 
<UserRole, 
‘TransplantSurgeon’>, 
  <LR, ‘yes’>,  
  <Op_id, ‘R_A’>, 
  <PO_Subj_id,  ‘Alice’ >, 
  <PO_Problem, 
‘Termination’>} 
 
 
The message associated with the TP11 permission could 
only be sent to a Transplant Surgeon who has an established 
LR with the patient. Also the transplant surgeon could only 
access the data upon Level 1 Override if he possesses an 
LR. 
B. Permissions for Scenario 2 (Location data) 
Now consider the case of a technician user querying the data 
produced by medical equipment, and also tracking data for 
the equipment, to confirm that everything is working 
properly. Data indicating the identity of patients using the 
equipment should not be discoverable. 
TP13 below grants access to the equipment-generated data, 
but not to its association with any particular patient. 
 
TP13  Permit_TP (N):  
{<Database>, ‘Medical Equipment’>, 
<UserRole, ‘Technician’>, 
  <Op_id, ‘R’>, 
  <PO_EVENT_M, ‘EquipGeneratedData’>} 
 
 
 Now consider historical location data (includes date and 
time) for both patients and equipment. The TP14 permission 
below grants access to location data.  
 
TP14  Permit_TP (N):  
{<Database, ‘LocationTracking’>, 
<UserRole, ‘Technician’>, 
  <Op_id, ‘R’>, 
  <PO_EVENT_M, ‘LocationData’>} 
 
 
However TP15 and TP16 can be used to re-present the 
location data to the technician, only for the date and time the 
equipment is used for the particular patient. (Note these 
permissions will be preferred to TP14 because of 
NearestMatch – see section VII.C below) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TP15  Reset_TP (N) 
<Location, ‘Default’> :  
{<Database, 
‘LocationTracking’>, 
 <UserRole, ‘Technician’>, 
 <Op_id, R>, 
 <PO_Equip, ‘Equip_id’>,  
  <PO_DateTimePeriod, 
DateTimePeriod>, 
  < PO_Event_M, 
‘EquipGeneratedData’>} 
 
TP16  Reset_TP (N) 
<Location, ‘Default’> :  
{<Database, 
‘LocationTracking’>, 
<UserRole, ‘Technician’>, 
  <Op_id, ‘R’>, 
   <PO_Patient, 
‘Patient_id’>,  
  <PO_DateTimePeriod, 
DateTimePeriod>, 
  < PO_Event_M, 
‘EquipGeneratedData’>} 
 
This will prevent inferences being drawn about treatments 
(i.e. where the patient location and the equipment location 
coincide). The defaults for the patient might be the ward she 
normally stays in, and for the equipment where it is normally 
stored, or the phrase “in use”. 
The following TP grants access to correct patient location 
data for HCPs. Other TPs could provide the same access for 
other roles or individuals. 
 
TP17  Permit_TP (N) :  
{<Database, ‘LocationTracking’>, 
<UserRole, ‘HCP’>, 
  <Op_id, ‘R’>, 
  <PO_Event_M, ‘PatientLocationData’>} 
 
Where the current equipment location data is made routinely 
available, e.g. in a display screen in an emergency room, the 
displaying of a particular piece of equipment’s location could 
be labelled as “in use”, or at its normal location. The actual 
current location information could be entered into the hospital 
information system, for access by appropriately authorized 
users when needed. 
VII. TCM2 OVEERVIEW 
In this section we summarize further aspects of the TCM2 
authorization model. More detailed expositions can be found 
in [9, 10]. 
A. Classifiers 
The TCM2 model is based on the RBAC concepts of users, 
operations and protected objects [1]; however these concepts 
are now represented by classifiers, as illustrated in the 
previous section. The simplest form of classifier corresponds 
to an attribute, as used in ABAC [3]. User classifiers can take 
the role of parameters in parameterized RBAC; extended 
classifiers are defined for combinations of user, operation and 
protected object, and collection classifiers can be created to 
facilitate authorizations for collections of objects. Classifier 
values are structured into hierarchies, which can be 
represented as inverted trees, with less-specialized values 
placed nearer the root. Classifier values can be provided by 
several mechanisms (stored database values, generator 
programs, and external applications). A classifier ordering is 
determined by the security architect or analyst, to indicate 
importance for matching (ie deciding the authorization 
outcome). For example if the classifier User_id was deemed 
to be more important than UserRole when deciding 
authorization, then a permission with a User_id value match 
would be preferred to another permission (not containing the 
User_id value) which was matched by a UserRole value.  
The model also includes an override operation which allows 
a user to acquire a more specialized classifier value (if he was 
specifically authorized to use this type of override); e.g. a 
JuniorPsychiatrist might acquire the role (ie classifier value) 
of ConsultantPsychiatrist in an emergency situation, if he was 
authorized to use an override permission. 
B. T Permissions 
A TP consists of a set of classifier values, and other 
properties, as illustrated in section VI. Other, derived, TPs 
may be produced using the classifier value hierarchies for 
each classifier present in a TP. For example.  A TP which 
includes the classifier value <UserRole, ‘Psychiatrist’> could 
produce a second, derived TP which includes the classifier 
value <UserRole, ‘SeniorPsychiatrist’>. Ranges of classifier 
values can be specified in a TP. 
A TP will match (ie qualify to authorize a transaction) if all 
of its classifier values (describing the user, operation and 
object) are present in the transaction (described in terms of 
classifiers or attributes).  Additionally, a TP will match if one 
of its derived TPs matches. This is described in section VIII 
below. 
A TCM2 implementation builds the permission, checks that 
it doesn’t repeat or conflict with existing permissions, and 
then generates an explanation of the permission for 
validation. 
C. Deny Levels 
Deny TPs are specified at increasing levels of power, called 
Deny Levels. A deny level contains deny permissions 
specified at lower deny levels. Therefore data could be denied 
to users who might be able to access it by Level 1 Override 
(if so authorized), whereas more sensitive data might be only 
available to more senior users who were authorized to 
override at Level 2 or higher. A single Level 1 Override is 
defined for the scenarios presented in section VI.A; the 
assumption is that a Level 2 Override will be specified for a 
healthcare application ‘super user’, which would provide 
access to all data. 
D. TP Sets 
TPs can be defined as having membership in separate, 
independent T Permission Sets, or TP Sets. TP Sets can be 
used separately to determine authorization, or combined.  
Representation of different levels of processing can be 
accomplished with TP Sets, e.g. government regulations 
(TPS1), consumer-specified directives (TPS2), and directives 
specified by proxies for consumers (TPS3). Therefore TPS1 
authorizations can be preferred to TPS2 authorizations, if this 
is what the security architect requires. 
In the examples in section VI.A, access to health records is 
provided by one TP Set. 
VIII. PERMISSIONS PROCESSING: MATCHED SEQUENCES 
A. Overview 
A full formal specification of TCM2 [18] has been developed 
using the B Method, and extracts from this specification are 
included in this section. Permissions processing depends on 
two main principles: TP Match, and Nearest Match, which 
we describe below. 
B. TP Match 
Firstly, a T Permission will match (ie qualify to authorize a 
transaction) if all its classifier values are contained in the 
transaction. Additionally, a TP will match if one of its derived 
TPs matches.  
This can be expressed formally using B by the following 
definition: 
 
  TPPermitAccess (tp, acvals) ≙  
              bool (dom (acvals ⋂ ad [tp]) =dom (tp)) 
 
where acvals is the transaction active classifier values 
(classifier values specifying the transaction), and tp is a T 
Permission which permits access. The set ad[tp] contains the 
original ancestor classifier values as well as the set of all 
descendant classifier values. That is, access is granted if for 
every classifier in the domain of tp there exists at least one 
classifier value in common between the active classifier 
values acvals and the classifier values of tp and all their 
descendants.  Similarly for TPDenyAccess. 
C. Nearest Match TP 
The second principle concerns determining which of two TPs 
(taken from a set of Matched TPs) is the stronger or nearer 
match to a transaction. This Nearest Match TP would then 
have a higher priority in determining the authorization 
outcome. 
A TP is a set of classifier values.  There is an ordering cfiersq 
on the classifiers that is set by the security architect and is a 
mapping of the set of inte.g.ers 1,2,3,4....to the set of 
classifiers. 
 
cfiersq ∈iseq (cfiers) 
 
Given the ordering on the classifiers then for any set of 
classifier values cvs there exists a classifier for that set which 
is the most important classifier i.e. the lowest in the ordering. 
 
CFIERL (cvs) = cfiersq (min (cfiersq- 1[dom (cvs)]) 
 
There also exists an associated ordering number for that 
classifier and an associated value: 
 
             NCFIERL (cvs) = min (cfiersq- 1[dom (cvs)]) 
             VCFIERL (cvs) = cvs [CFIERL (cvs))] 
 
Therefore, given a set of matched TPs tps the (set of) nearest 
match(es) is given by 
 
NearestMatch(tps) ≙{nmtp | nmtp ∈ tps ⋀ 
   ¬Ǝtp. (tp ∈ tps ⋀  
   ( 
     NCFIERL(nmtp - tp ⋂nmtp)  >   
     NCFIERL(tp - tp ⋂ nmtp)   ⋁ 
    VCFIERL(nmtp - tp ⋂ nmtp) ↦  
    VCFIERL(tp - tp ⋂ nmtp) ∈ ad) 
    )  
  } 
 
where ad is the ancestor/descendant relationship. 
The classifier ordering sequence cfiersq can be varied for 
different applications and data models, but given the data 
model and application, it is: 
 
EventM_id, EventD_id, Userid, Roleid,  
 
Regarding implementation, the sequence of Nearest Match 
TP can be produced by sorting tps firstly by their cfiersq 
classifier value, and within this by position in the classifier 
value hierarchy. 
D. Normal TP Processing Example 
For the transaction given in section III.B, the Initially-
Matched set of TPs, and the Nearest Match TP sequence 
(following removal of all Override TPs) are: 
 
Initially-Matched TPs 
TP1 Permit_TP (N) 
TP2 Permit_TP (L1_Ovr) 
TP3  Deny_TP (L1) 
TP7 Deny_TP (L1) 
TP11   Deny_TP (L1) 
TP12 Permit_TP (L1_ovr) 
 
Nearest-Matched TPs (no overrides) 
TP1 Permit_TP (N) 1 
TP3  Deny_TP (L1) 2 
TP7 Deny_TP (L1) 3 
TP11 Deny_TP (L1) 4 
 
The match strength is indicated in ascending order, starting 
with the weakest (i.e. 1).  
Processing the Nearest-Match TP sequence authorizes the 
retrieval of all data except the Termination and Psychosis 
data. The strongest match, TP11, will exactly match the 
transaction, and will deny access to the Termination data for 
Transplant Surgeons; it will generate a message, though, just 
for TransplantSurgeons. TP7 and TP3 deny access to the 
Psychiatric and Termination data for all HCPs. TP1 permits 
access to all data, except the Psychiatric and Termination data 
for all HCPs (which is denied by the later permissions in the 
sequence. 
E. Override TP Processing Example 
Consider the transaction from section 3.B. The same initially-
matched TPs are returned. However on applying Level 1 
Override (L1_ovr) the sequence of Nearest-Matched TPs 
shown below is produced. These TPs authorize access to the 
termination and unrestricted data, while still denying access 
to the psychosis data. 
 
 
 Nearest Match TPs (L1_ovr) 
TP1     Permit_TP (N)                1 
TP2     Permit_TP (L1_Ovr)      2 
TP3     Deny_TP (L1)                3 
TP7     Deny_TP (L1)                4 
TP12   Permit_TP (L1_Ovr)      5 
IX. PERMISSIONS PROCESSING: TCM2 IMPLEMENTATION 
A. Overview 
Consider a large implementation of the records model 
outlined in section V. Also that each permission corresponds 
to a query, specifying qualifying or denied records. The 
Nearest Match sequences can be expressed in SQL-like 
subqueries. In such a system, a query to find records 
permitted by the Nearest Match Sequence could first retrieve 
the relatively small set of data for the patient, maybe by a 
map-reduce approach. Then this data could be filtered by 
query corresponding to an optimized SQL-like subquery to 
retrieve permitted records. 
We firstly illustrate with the simple Protected Object example 
outlined in sections III.B, and then proceed to consider the 
wider data model scenario. The user’s transaction is 
expressed in SQL, which is then augmented by adding 
WHERE clause elements which implement the Nearest 
Match sequence. The query is then structurally optimized 
using relational database techniques to produce the query to 
be executed by the underlying storage system. 
B. Problem Transaction Query 
The transaction consists of John the Transplant Surgeon, 
querying Alice’s EHR to discover data about previous 
pregnancies. This data is denied to him by permission TP7 
from section VI.A, under normal processing. 
 
SELECT * FROM  PROBLEM 
WHERE  
Patient_id = 2220 /*Alice*/  
 
The previous query has now been augmented with code 
derived from the Nearest Match TP sequence in section 
VIII.D. When regarded as a database query, this sequence 
describes all the user – operation – protected objects 
permitted by the transaction. When the augmented SQL is 
combined with the transaction SQL, there is very often huge 
scope for structural query optimization, as is illustrated in the 
example below: 
 
SELECT * FROM  PROBLEM 
WHERE  
Patient_id = 2220 
AND -- TP1 PO part 
PO_id in 
        (SELECT PO_id FROM EVENT_M) 
AND -- TP3 PO part 
       NOT PO_id IN 
              (SELECT PO_id FROM PROBLEM WHERE 
               PO_TYPE = ‘Termination’) 
 AND  -- TP7  PO part 
       NOT PO_id IN  
               (SELECT PO_id FROM PROBLEM WHERE 
                PO_TYPE = ‘Psychosis’) 
AND -- TP11 PO part 
        NOT PO_id IN  
                (SELECT PO_id FROM PROBLEM WHERE  
                PO_TYPE = ‘Termination’) 
 
       
Expressed in SQL, rather than the internal data structures of 
the TCM2 system, this query is optimized to: 
 
SELECT * FROM PROBLEM 
WHERE  
Patient_id = 2220 
AND PO_id NOT IN  
 (SELECT PO_id FROM PROBLEM WHERE  
                  PO_TYPE = ‘Termination’) 
AND PO_id NOT IN  
 (SELECT PO_id FROM PROBLEM WHERE  
                  PO_TYPE = ‘Psychosis’) 
 
Similarly, the Level 1 Override permissions example would 
be optimized to: 
 
 
SELECT * FROM PROBLEM 
WHERE  
Patient_id = 2220 
AND PO_id NOT IN  
 (SELECT PO_id FROM PROBLEM WHERE 
                  PO_TYPE = ‘Psychosis’) 
 
C. Event Query 
Now we consider the query which returns all detailed events 
for a patient. 
 
SELECT * FROM EVENT_D 
WHERE  
Patient_id = 2220 /*Alice*/  
 
Generally, authorization for EVENT_D records are 
determined by 
• any EVENT_Ms they are associated with (similar 
to PROBLEM in the previous section), and  
• other TPs they are directly matched to.  
 
Therefore if this query is executed by the Transplant Surgeon 
without any overrides, the same NM list would be produced. 
The final SQL query is 
 
SELECT EVENT_D.* FROM EVENT_D*PROBLEM 
WHERE  
Patient_id = 2220  AND 
EVENT_D.PROBLEM_PO_ID = PROBLEM.PO_ID 
AND PROBLEM_PO_id NOT IN  
 (SELECT PO_id FROM PROBLEM WHERE 
                  PO_TYPE = ‘Termination’) 
AND PROBLEM.PO_id NOT IN  
 (SELECT PO_id FROM PROBLEM WHERE 
                  PO_TYPE = ‘Psychosis’) 
 
 
Now suppose that the patient wished to make a particular 
psychiatric EVENT_D record, with PO_id = 123, available 
to the transplant Surgeon. This can be accomplished by 
creating a new permission to display this EVENT_D to a 
Transplant Surgeon. Because this permission is defined for 
an EVENT_D record, it will appear later in the Nearest Match 
sequence than the EVENT_M deny permission for 
psychiatric data, and will actually be the last in the sequence. 
The resulting SQL query, which retrieves it, is 
 
SELECT EVENT_D.* FROM EVENT_D*PROBLEM 
WHERE Patient_id = 2220  AND 
ENTRY.PROBLEM_PO_ID = PROBLEM.PO_ID 
AND  
( 
PROBLEM.PO_id NOT IN  
 (SELECT PO_id FROM PROBLEM WHERE 
                   PO_TYPE = ‘Termination’) AND 
PROBLEM.PO_id NOT IN  
 (SELECT PO_id FROM PROBLEM WHERE  
                     PO_TYPE = ‘Psychosis’) 
) 
OR 
PO_id = 123 
 
X. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION 
We have implemented all of the functionality described 
above in a prototype Privacy Preferences Tool. This project 
is being undertaken with funding from the UK Information 
Commisioners’s Office [19], in collaboration with the Great 
North Care Record Project [20]. The main characteristics of 
the Privacy Preferences Tool are: 
 
• Privacy Directives can be specified either during a 
consultation with an information specialist/HCP 
who receives and enters the directives, or by patients 
themselves if they have been provided with an 
online account. The same dashboard is used by a 
specialist and by the patient. 
• The interaction is modelled on an imaginary 
conversation between patient and doctor. The 
patient is guided to identify data (the entities 
described in section V), and then to identify users 
(by team, role, or user_id) which is the subject of the 
permission. 
• The patient identifies whether access is to be 
permitted or denied, and at what level (normal query 
or override) 
• The patient inspects a simple natural language 
description of the privacy preference, and then tests 
its effect by running queries on their own data. If 
they, and also the medical specialist is happy, then 
the medical specialist turns the preference into a 
permission which is enforced by the medical records 
system. If an impasse occurs, a targeted message 
similar to the one described in scenario 1 section 
III.B can be investigated. 
 
The most significant comment from the focus group 
evaluations with members of the public so far is that 
developing and verifying privacy preferences of the nature 
described n Scenarios 1 and 2 is “straightforward”. Further 
comments concerning user interface design are currently 
being pursued. 
 
 
XI. RELATED WORK 
More details of TCM2 authorisation model and its formal 
specification can be found in [8,9,18]. These publications give 
a detailed comparison with ABAC and RBAC research 
literature. However this is the first paper on the use of the 
database pattern and model based on the MIG Detailed Care 
record, and our current Privacy Preferences Tool research 
demonstrator. 
The capturing and implementation of Privacy Preferences 
is a substantial part of most health and social care information 
systems development. Recent standards in the UK are GDPR, 
GMC, NHS. One particularly interesting development is 
described in [21], where the patient controls which medical 
professionals can access their data. The conceptual starting 
point is inspection of medical records, whereas our starting 
point, as reflected in our implementation, is a conversation 
between the patient and the care professional. 
 
XII. CONCLUSIONS 
The idea that patients should have ownership and 
responsibility for their health records, and that they should 
grant clinicians access to their data, is very different to what 
people thought would happen. Yet, this is now what is 
happening. Further predictions are that records that will be 
held remotely from hospitals and other providers, owned by 
patients, and accessed through smartphones and tablets. 
 
We have shown how our TCM2 model can support the 
authorization capabilities required by this vision of the future. 
TCM2 can be also used for other information systems, 
including citizen information systems covering health and 
social care, financial, work-seeking and other aspects. Our 
TCM2 extensions to ABAC (data model, break glass 
overrides, alerting) can be implemented by ABAC systems 
based on the XACML standard. 
In addition to our current Privacy Preferences Tool, several 
relational database demonstrators of our TCM2 model have 
previously been implemented by ourselves and others, and 
the approaches to complex authorizations and override 
positively evaluated within healthcare information system 
projects, and research and commercial ventures. 
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